The 1033 Program and American Policing

           
Edited 4/15/16: Edits were made in order to shorten the piece as well as refocus the initial post as it relates to the final two posts in the series. 

"We are what we pretend to be, so we must be careful about what we pretend to be."

-Kurt Vonnegut

American policing has been a very hot topic in American political discourse over the last few years. Some believe they are witnessing well-needed advancements in the field of policing, whereas others believe we are seeing American law enforcement overstepping its bounds and entering the realm of becoming a military force. As far as you and I are concerned, for the time being the rights and wrongs of those questions don’t matter. For now, let’s just focus on what is causing the debate. It’s called the 1033 program and it is fascinating. For the first post in this series I’m simply going to discuss what exactly this program is. After that we will discuss what it all means. 

In the late 1980s, the United States saw an explosion in usage rates of crack cocaine. Many refer to it now as the American Crack Epidemic. In 1989, seemingly in response to the looming specter of societal breakdown, the United States Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act of 1990. Section 1208, titled Transfer of Excess Personal Property, authorized the Department of Defense to transfer surplus military equipment to state and local police agencies for the purpose of conducting “counter-drug activities” (NDAA 1990). The program was re-upped in the NDAA of 1997, Sec. 1033. Specific provisions of the program as it stands include a requirement that the property must be accepted as-is, and the costs of shipping, maintaining, and repairing equipment must be covered by the receiving agency (JustNet).

Amongst the equipment transferred through the program are "MRAPs," such as this one being used in Afghanistan.

Pictured is an MRAP in use by a local police department.

According to NPR, the totality of the transfers of property have included: ~79,000 assault rifles, 205 grenade launchers, ~12,000 bayonets, $124 million in night vision equipment (including marksman scopes), and ~500 bomb disposal robots. In 2014, the total cost of the 1033 expenditures rang in at around $980 million (NPR). In terms of those MRAPs above, roughly 600 have been distributed. For those keeping count, that’s around 10 per state; Los Angeles County, for example, holds 9 (NPR, Marshall Project). The program has provided police with a robust source of equipment for many years now.

                        Yet, it seems that the tides are changing and it is time for a conversation. In the fall of 2015 the Obama administration announced that it was recalling a large quantity of the equipment issued under the program (Burke). The executive order included new policing standards requirements for agencies receiving equipment, and called for the creation of a list that tracked the equipment (EO 13688). Some would likely argue that the recall was a political move in response to the events in Ferguson, MO in 2014. In fact, one strong opponent of the recall is Oakland County Sheriff Michael Bouchard. Sheriff Bouchard has stated that, "We're actually taking away a proven asset from law enforcement all over the country, destroying on many levels our ability to handle a very big situation, any situation like [the Bataclan shooting in] Paris” (Hall and Brasier). In my conversations with Bouchard, he re-emphasized this sentiment. Bouchard felt that simply taking the straight quantities of equipment didn't tell the full story--one must understand the specifics of the equipment. He pointed to the bayonets, for example. The Oakland County Sheriff's Department uses its 1033 bayonets for its honor guard. These are the officers present at funerals and are not used in the field. This being said Bouchard’s department currently holds $4.6 million in 1033 equipment, including multiple armored vehicles (Kampe). For the rest of this blog series the focus will shift away from the 1033 Program on a national scale and simply look to the interaction between the Oakland County Sheriff’s Department and the citizens of Oakland County, an interaction informed by the presence of this equipment.

            While this is all well and good, this is not a blog that simply attempts to report on what is happening in this country and in my county. In this blog I hope to interrogate the philosophical underpinnings of the situation and ask the question, “Are we witnessing a democratic failure?” This question really hinges on the normative nature of the relationship between the citizen and the state. The question, in this case, deals with the acceptability of violence in our society. To bring it into a philosophical context, Rousseau stated that “might makes right” leads to, “…nothing but inexplicable nonsense…as soon as might makes right, the effect changes along with the cause; any new force that overcomes the first also inherits its rights,” and, “Force is a physical power; I do not see what kind of morality can result from its effects” (Rousseau 87). It seems to be the case that if this equipment is unnecessary for the execution of the duties of these local law enforcement agencies, or it gives them the capability for excessive violence they are no longer serving their purpose. It would mean that the Sheriff is failing in his duties, utilizing a “might makes right” form of governance, and we are witnessing a democratic failure. Yet, on the other hand, if its found to be the case that the Oakland County Sheriff is within his “rights” as an official to carry out his duties in such a manner, it is proper. Mill very clearly stated, “that the whole people…exercise through deputies periodically elected by themselves, the ultimate controlling power…They must be masters, whenever they please, of all the operations of government” (Mill 422). Sheriff Bouchard is an elected official. If he deems this equipment necessary for the execution of his duties, is he not within his rights to hold such assets?

We will talk about all of these questions in my next post so stay tuned.

 As a note, the views expressed in the title of the above video, and the description are those of the Youtube user and should not be taken as an indication of my views. The video was simply the best I could find of a police raid utilizing the equipment discussed in this post.

Bibliography

"The 1033 Program." JUSTNET. National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center, n.d. Web. 17 Mar. 2016.

Burke, Melissa Nann. "Mich. Officials Push Back as Feds Recall Military Gear." Detroit News. The Detroit News, 23 Dec. 2015. Web. 17 Mar. 2016.

"DLA Disposition Services." Defense Logistics Agency. Defense Logistics Agency, n.d. Web. 17 Mar. 2016.

Exec. Order No. 13688, 3 C.F.R. (2015). Print.

Hall, Christina, and L. L. Brasier. "Michigan Cops Fume over Loss of U.S. Military Vehicles." Livingston Daily. N.p., 3 Dec. 2015. Web. 17 Mar. 2016.

Hall, Christina. "Macomb, Oakland Sheriffs to Get Surplus Armored Vehicles." Detroit Free Press. N.p., 11 Jan. 2016. Web. 17 Mar. 2016.

Kampe, Paul. "Oakland County Sheriff Michael Bouchard Criticizes Federal Recall of ‘scary’ Equipment." The Oakland Press. The Oakland Press, 15 Nov. 2015. Web. 17 Mar. 2016.

Mill, John Stuart. Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Ed. Bruce L. Kinzer and John M. Robson. Toronto: U of Toronto, 1988. Print.

"MRAPs And Bayonets: What We Know About The Pentagon's 1033 Program." NPR. NPR, 2 Sept. 2014. Web. 17 Mar. 2016.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, 3230 § 104-201-1033 (H.R. 1996). Print.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, 2461 § 1208 (H.R. 1989). Print.

"The Pentagon Finally Details Its Weapons-for-Cops Giveaway." The Marshall Project. The Marshall Project, n.d. Web. 17 Mar. 2016.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Rousseau's Political Writings: New Translations, Interpretive Notes, Backgrounds, Commentaries. Ed. Alan Ritter and Julia Conaway. Bondanella. New York: W.W. Norton, 1988. Print.